Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
Import241208061232 (talk | contribs)
Normalize DOI.
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random paths to stability in the roommate problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On randomized matching mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: NP-complete stable matching problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.002 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 06:02, 10 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers