Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (Q1994202): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:59, 16 December 2024

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Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
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    Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (English)
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    1 November 2018
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    dynamic principal-agent models
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    imperfect public information
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    asymmetric beliefs
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    hidden actions
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    hidden states
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