Groups, collective decisions and markets (Q629334): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The core of the matching game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Core in a simple coalition formation game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Multilateral bargaining problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The stability of hedonic coalition structures / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Rational Household Labor Supply / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Valuation equilibrium with clubs / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competitive equilibrium with local public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Clubs and the Market / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Clubs and the market: Large finite economies / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4495219 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: When inefficiency begets efficiency / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Club theory and household formation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bargaining cum voice / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4902563 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The assignment game. I: The core / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Tiebout theorem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 19:59, 3 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Groups, collective decisions and markets
scientific article

    Statements

    Groups, collective decisions and markets (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    9 March 2011
    0 references
    household behavior
    0 references
    household formation
    0 references
    collective decision making
    0 references
    general equilibrium
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers