Zero-sum differential games involving hybrid controls (Q2499372): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 17:59, 24 June 2024
scientific article
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English | Zero-sum differential games involving hybrid controls |
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Zero-sum differential games involving hybrid controls (English)
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14 August 2006
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A zero-sum differential game with hybrid controls is studied in which both players are allowed to use continuous as well as discrete controls. The state of the system is changed discontinuously when the trajectory hits predefined sets, an autonomous jump set \(A\) or a controlled jump set \(C\), where one controller can choose to jump or not. At each jump, the trajectory can move to a different Euclidean space. One player uses all the three types of controls, namely, continuous controls, autonomous jumps, and controlled jumps; the other player uses continuous controls and autonomous jumps. Continuity of the associated lower and upper value functions \(V^-\) and \(V^+\) is proved. Using the dynamic programming principle satisfied by \(V^-\) and \(V^+\), lower and upper quasivariational inequalities are derived. The lower and upper value functions are characterized as the unique viscosity solutions of the corresponding quasivariational inequalities. Finally, an Isaacs like condition for the game to have a value is provided.
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dynamic programming principle
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viscosity solutions
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quasi variational inequalities
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