The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements (Q385170): Difference between revisions

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+Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
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+International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
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+Pollution control: A differential game approach
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+HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
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+Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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+An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
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+Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
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