Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions (Q533941): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004 / rank
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Property / cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence. / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.12.004 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 9 December 2024

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Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
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