On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents (Q330281): Difference between revisions

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+Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
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+Evolutionary game dynamics
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+Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
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