Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s11238-005-6594-1
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+Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
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+Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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+Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
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+The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
@@ Property / cites work: The likelihood of dubious election outcomes / rank @@
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+Q3748279
@@ Property / cites work: Q3748279 / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures
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+On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
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+The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
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+.1007/S11238-005-6594-1
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S11238-005-6594-1 / rank @@
+Normal rank