A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule (Q898669): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multilateral bargaining problems
@@ Property / cites work: Multilateral bargaining problems / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining conventions
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining conventions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining and Value
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining and Value / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Odd man out: The proposal-making model
@@ Property / cites work: Odd man out: The proposal-making model / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
@@ Property / cites work: Nash bargaining in ordinal environments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Subgame Perfect Implementation
@@ Property / cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
@@ Property / cites work: Subscription mechanisms for network formation. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Bargaining Problem
@@ Property / cites work: The Bargaining Problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Two-Person Cooperative Games
@@ Property / cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bargaining with an agenda
@@ Property / cites work: Bargaining with an agenda / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Axiomatic models of bargaining
@@ Property / cites work: Axiomatic models of bargaining / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5623557
@@ Property / cites work: Q5623557 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3843226
@@ Property / cites work: Q3843226 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3624168
@@ Property / cites work: Q3624168 / rank @@
+Normal rank