On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions (Q777967): Difference between revisions

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+Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
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+Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
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+A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
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+Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
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+The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
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+The sample complexity of auctions with side information
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+Revenue maximization with a single sample
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+Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
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+Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
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+Making the Most of Your Samples
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+Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
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+Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
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+Optimal Auction Design
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