Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents (Q2013373): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
@@ Property / cites work: Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Self-selective social choice functions
@@ Property / cites work: Self-selective social choice functions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
@@ Property / cites work: Behavioral aspects of implementation theory / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Role of honesty in full implementation
@@ Property / cites work: Role of honesty in full implementation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
+Normal rank