Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences (Q2467525): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dictatorial domains
@@ Property / cites work: Dictatorial domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting by Committees
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation and the Pareto rule
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation and the Pareto rule / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of social choice functions
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of social choice functions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank