Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' (Q1376987): Difference between revisions

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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+Generalized median voter schemes and committees
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+A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
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+Voting under constraints
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+Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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+Generalized median social welfare functions
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+Q4885922
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+The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
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+Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
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+Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
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+Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
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