Equivalences between two matching models: stability (Q1714490): Difference between revisions

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+Q5789040
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup>
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+Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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+Q3999327
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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