Evolution and information in a gift-giving game (Q5952422): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Q4223194 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Social Norms and Community Enforcement / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: p-Dominance and Belief Potential / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The Evolution of Conventions / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Latest revision as of 22:13, 3 June 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1688915
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Evolution and information in a gift-giving game |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1688915 |
Statements
Evolution and information in a gift-giving game (English)
0 references
6 November 2002
0 references
The authors examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. The players may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the value of the gift is ``smaller than twice'' (resp. ``more than four times'') the cost, then gifts are ``not given'' (resp. ``exchanged''). In the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation.
0 references
evolution
0 references
information
0 references
learning
0 references
repeated games
0 references
