Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals (Q1794909): Difference between revisions

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+Recurrence of the unfit
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+Normal rank
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+Evolutionary stability in games of communication
@@ Property / cites work: Evolutionary stability in games of communication / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategic Information Transmission
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Information Transmission / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Q4439632
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+Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
@@ Property / cites work: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics / rank @@
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+Q3040961
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+Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
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+Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
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+On evolutionarily stable sets
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+Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
@@ Property / cites work: Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game / rank @@
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+Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
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