Stability of an allocation of objects (Q6156320): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 08:21, 1 August 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7695294
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Stability of an allocation of objects
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7695294

    Statements

    Stability of an allocation of objects (English)
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    13 June 2023
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    assignment problem
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    core
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    bargaining set
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    top trading cycles
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