Selling two goods optimally (Q1641015): Difference between revisions

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@@ aliases / en / 0 / aliases / en / 0 @@
+Selling Two Goods Optimally
@@ description / en / description / en @@
+scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6504627
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+Selling Two Goods Optimally (English)
@@ Property / title: Selling Two Goods Optimally (English) / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Open document ID @@
+.91246
@@ Property / zbMATH Open document ID: 1396.91246 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_52
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_52 / rank @@
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@@ Property / published in @@
+Automata, Languages, and Programming
@@ Property / published in: Automata, Languages, and Programming / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / publication date @@
+November 2015Timestamp +2015-11-04T00:00:00Z
Timezone +00:00
Calendar Gregorian
Precision 1 day
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After 0
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++2015-11-04T00:00:00Z
-Timezone
++00:00
-Calendar
+Gregorian
-Precision
+day
 Before
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@@ Property / publication date: 4 November 2015 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6504627
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6504627 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2963423330
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2963423330 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
@@ Property / cites work: The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Matching theory
@@ Property / cites work: Matching theory / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Graphs and matching theorems
@@ Property / cites work: Graphs and matching theorems / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal mechanisms with simple menus / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Selling two goods optimally
@@ Property / cites work: Selling two goods optimally / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items
+Normal rank