College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (Q1757600): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Created claim: Wikidata QID (P12): Q125879831, #quickstatements; #temporary_batch_1719268963399
Normalize DOI.
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College assignment as a large contest / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: School choice: an experimental study / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4370586 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3959963 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: All-pay auctions with risk-averse players / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5323812 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contest architecture / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competing auctions with endogenous quantities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: All-Pay Contests / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.009 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 08:47, 11 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
scientific article

    Statements

    College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    15 January 2019
    0 references
    college admissions
    0 references
    incomplete information
    0 references
    student welfare
    0 references
    contests
    0 references
    all-pay auctions
    0 references
    experiment
    0 references

    Identifiers