Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness (Q6164134): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1007/s40505-023-00247-5
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00247-5
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W4366991731
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W4366991731 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3254691
@@ Property / cites work: Q3254691 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3993509
@@ Property / cites work: Q3993509 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S40505-023-00247-5
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S40505-023-00247-5 / rank @@
+Normal rank