The Condorcet paradox revisited (Q2629515): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 14:52, 30 December 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The Condorcet paradox revisited |
scientific article |
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The Condorcet paradox revisited (English)
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6 July 2016
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This paper discusses the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. The analysis employs the concepts of bargaining power, risk coefficient and perfect equilibrium. It is shown that stationarity of subgames perfect equilibria ensure agreement within finite expected time and that, for generic parameter values, SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles.
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Condorcet paradox
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majority rule
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strategic bargaining
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