What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals (Q423731): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B69 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6042480 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
mechanism design
Property / zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
costly signals
Property / zbMATH Keywords: costly signals / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
priority lists
Property / zbMATH Keywords: priority lists / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
lotteries
Property / zbMATH Keywords: lotteries / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2053073896 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 07:54, 5 July 2024

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What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
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