Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains (Q483577): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7 / rank
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6381188 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
preference aggregation
Property / zbMATH Keywords: preference aggregation / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
strategy-proofness
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
tops-onlyness
Property / zbMATH Keywords: tops-onlyness / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
voting by committees
Property / zbMATH Keywords: voting by committees / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2013824052 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10058-013-0149-7 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 18:49, 9 December 2024

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Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
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