The strategically ignorant principal (Q523523): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B44
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+A20
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B40
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6706940
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6706940 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+value of information
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: value of information / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+informed principal problem
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: informed principal problem / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+mechanism design
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2593243513
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2593243513 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
@@ Property / cites work: Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Informed principal with correlation
@@ Property / cites work: Informed principal with correlation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Arm's Length Relationships
@@ Property / cites work: Arm's Length Relationships / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Informed principal and countervailing incentives
@@ Property / cites work: Informed principal and countervailing incentives / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2816007
@@ Property / cites work: Q2816007 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
@@ Property / cites work: Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
@@ Property / cites work: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:523523