Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764): Difference between revisions

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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5884779 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
stable matching
Property / zbMATH Keywords: stable matching / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
incentive compatibility
Property / zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
dormitory assignment
Property / zbMATH Keywords: dormitory assignment / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0210-5 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2017584848 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:12, 4 July 2024

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Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
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