Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions (Q533941): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Importer (talk | contribs)
Created a new Item
 
Normalize DOI.
 
(8 intermediate revisions by 7 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / author
 
Property / author: Harrison H. C. Cheng / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5886267 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
asymmetry
Property / zbMATH Keywords: asymmetry / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
revenue effect
Property / zbMATH Keywords: revenue effect / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
first-price auctions
Property / zbMATH Keywords: first-price auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
private value
Property / zbMATH Keywords: private value / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / author
 
Property / author: Harrison H. C. Cheng / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1974665451 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.12.004 / rank
 
Normal rank
links / mardi / namelinks / mardi / name
 

Latest revision as of 20:43, 9 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers