Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005 / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
-Kevin Leyton-Brown
@@ Property / author: Kevin Leyton-Brown / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
+Kevin Leyton-Brown
@@ Property / author: Kevin Leyton-Brown / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B26
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+A46
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A46 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+5909450
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5909450 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+mechanism design
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+combinatorial auctions
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+revenue
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: revenue / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
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+Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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+Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
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+Core-selecting package auctions
@@ Property / cites work: Core-selecting package auctions / rank @@
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+Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
@@ Property / cites work: Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. / rank @@
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+Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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+Incentives in Teams
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives in Teams / rank @@
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+Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
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+Q3524718
@@ Property / cites work: Q3524718 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3624066
@@ Property / cites work: Q3624066 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Combinatorial auction design
@@ Property / cites work: Combinatorial auction design / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4633886
@@ Property / cites work: Q4633886 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3867502
@@ Property / cites work: Q3867502 / rank @@
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+A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
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+Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
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+Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
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+The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
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+journals/ai/RastegariCL11
@@ Property / DBLP publication ID: journals/ai/RastegariCL11 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.08.005
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.08.005 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:543608