Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees (Q550195): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007 / rank
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5919003 / rank
 
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information aggregation
Property / zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
voting
Property / zbMATH Keywords: voting / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
asymmetric information
Property / zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
swing voter's curse
Property / zbMATH Keywords: swing voter's curse / rank
 
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Property / describes a project that uses: Z-Tree / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3121810695 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.09.007 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 21:19, 9 December 2024

scientific article
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Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
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    Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees (English)
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    8 July 2011
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    information aggregation
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    voting
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    asymmetric information
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    swing voter's curse
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