Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods (Q324135): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.002 / rank
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Latest revision as of 14:27, 9 December 2024

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Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
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    Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods (English)
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    10 October 2016
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    multi-unit auctions
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    Vickrey auctions
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    uniform-price auctions
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    wealth effects
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