Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object (Q5940598): Difference between revisions

Two allocation models are studied. In the first model the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences is considered. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, the allocation of an invisible object to a group of agents is studied. The rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonity are considered. It is shown that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and nonbossiness. The characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonity are provided. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, the characterizations are interpreted as impossibility results.