How moral codes evolve in a trust game (Q1651789): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 15:03, 29 February 2024
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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| English | How moral codes evolve in a trust game |
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How moral codes evolve in a trust game (English)
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10 July 2018
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Summary: This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has unstable oscillations around an interior Nash equilibrium (NE), but under smoothed best response dynamics we obtain convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE).
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prisoner's dilemma
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evolutionary stability
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moral codes
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