Rethinking Quine's argument on the collapse of modal distinctions (Q1381440): Difference between revisions
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scientific article
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English | Rethinking Quine's argument on the collapse of modal distinctions |
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Rethinking Quine's argument on the collapse of modal distinctions (English)
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17 March 1998
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This paper asks us to rethink what a principle of substitution is and ought to be. The author points out that Quine's argument collapsing modal distinctions via provability of \(\square p\leftrightarrow p\) depends upon use of an unrestricted version of a principle of substitution for singular terms. The unrestricted principle holds: if \(t\) and \(t'\) are codesignative then \(\varphi(t) \leftrightarrow \varphi(t')\) for any context \(\varphi\). He reminds us that Frege and Carnap used other versions of a principle of substitution which block the collapsing proof. The author goes on to bring out that A. Church and D. Kaplan used Quine's substitution principle but, by allowing ``world lines'' to be referents of singular terms in intensional contexts, block the collapsing proof.
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Quine
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modality
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intensionality
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substitution
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