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Revision as of 13:12, 20 February 2024
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English | Nash implementation with a private good |
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Nash implementation with a private good (English)
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25 March 2003
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The author constructs a mechanism for the implementation of constrained Lindahl outcomes in the presence of a private transferable good and shows that an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is constrained Lindahl. Next, the author considers the implementation of a class of social choice rules based on price, again establishing a Nash equilibrium criterion. Finally, the author generalizes arbitrary social planning problems subject to the conditions of montonicity and the existence of a private good.
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Nash implementation
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Lindahl equilibrium
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Walrasian equilibrium
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simple mechanisms
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monotonicity
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private good
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