Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run. (Q1399551): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 17:02, 20 February 2024
scientific article
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| English | Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run. |
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Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run. (English)
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30 July 2003
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An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk cost and imperfect competition is constrained. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. It tends to exhibit an excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum.
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dynamic games
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integer constraints
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