Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom (Q2472188): Difference between revisions

Let \((N, v)\) be a transferable utility cooperative game in coalition form. This paper axiomatizes the Owen coalitional value for such a game. The axioms are as follows: efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions. Notice that the additivity axiom is not needed. The proof is similarly to that of \textit{H. P. Young} [Int. J. Game Theory 14, 65--72 (1985; Zbl 0569.90106)]. When \((N, v)\) has level structure, then these four axioms lead to the \textit{E. Winter} [Int. J. Game Theory 18, No. 2, 227--240 (1989; Zbl 0675.90101)] coalitional value.