What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model? (Q5958676): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Optimal contracting of separable production technologies / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Revision as of 23:27, 3 June 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1715717
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model? |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1715717 |
Statements
What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model? (English)
0 references
3 March 2002
0 references
For typical parametrizations of the standard agency model, this paper demonstrates that the set of first-order conditions characterizing the optimal contract can be reduced to a single equation. A problem of investment financing under moral hazard is used to illustrate the reduced-form equation's usefulness in quantitative applications. When the agent has CARA preferences over consumption, it is shown that any exogenous limit on the penalties for low output is always binding.
0 references
Moral hazard
0 references
Numerical analysis
0 references
Reduced-form equation
0 references
Limited liability
0 references
