On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules (Q1081509): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 15:12, 17 June 2024

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On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
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    On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules (English)
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    1985
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    Within a cooperative framework it is shown that voting by successive amendments can enforce group decision rules (GDR) belonging to a certain class under the concept of strong equilibrium. For GDR's from another class it is shown that if individuals have linear orderings, then whenever there is a unique pairwise-best alternative, this must be the unique outcome in the core of game forms in which strategy sets are preference orderings. Within the non-cooperative case for certain GDR's it is shown that if individual preferences are strict, then the sophisticated equilibrium outcome of voting by sequential elimination is always Pareto efficient.
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    voting by successive amendments
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    group decision rules
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    strong equilibrium
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    core
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    sequential elimination
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