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Latest revision as of 11:59, 17 May 2024

scientific article
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Weakly implementable social choice rules
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    Weakly implementable social choice rules (English)
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    16 January 1993
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    minimum path independence
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    minimum resoluteness
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    pervasive veto power
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    multivalued social choice rules
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    partial implementability
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    strong Nash equilibria
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