Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. (Q1408709): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:23, 6 June 2024

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Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
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    Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. (English)
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    25 September 2003
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    Repeated games
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    Costly monitoring
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    Communication
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