Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners (Q1762845): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 14:23, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners |
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Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners (English)
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11 February 2005
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