Population games, stable games, and passivity (Q2351246): Difference between revisions

Summary: The class of ``stable games'', introduced by \textit{J. Hofbauer} and \textit{W. H. Sandholm} [J. Econ. Theory 144, No. 4, 1665--1693 (2009; Zbl 1175.91036)], has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a ``passive'' dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.