ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION (Q3166241): Difference between revisions

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+(All) equilibria in a class of bidding games
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+Normal rank
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+Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
+Normal rank
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+Bertrand without fudge
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+Normal rank
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+The discrete bid first auction
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+Normal rank
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+Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
+Normal rank
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+A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria
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+Normal rank
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+Allocating multiple units
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+Normal rank
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+Private versus complete information in auctions
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+Normal rank
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+Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
@@ Property / cites work: Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules / rank @@
+Normal rank