On the complete information first-price auction and its intuitive solution

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003040MaRDI QIDQ3166241zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm

Publication date 10 October 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911003040

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionsconflict resolutionundominated Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cites work

• (All) equilibria in a class of bidding games
• A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria
• Allocating multiple units
• Bertrand without fudge
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• The discrete bid first auction

Cited in

(5)

• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• Monotonicity and Rationalizability in a Large First Price Auction
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• Competition for procurement shares
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

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