ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003040zbMath1259.91050OpenAlexW3124259682MaRDI QIDQ3166241

José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911003040

zbMATH Keywords

conflict resolutionfirst-price auctionsundominated Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Competition for procurement shares

Cites Work

• A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria
• Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
• The discrete bid first auction
• Allocating multiple units
• Bertrand without fudge
• (All) equilibria in a class of bidding games
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules

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