Editor's introduction to Jean van Heijenoort, ``Historical development of modern logic'' (Q1942090): Difference between revisions

Irving H.~Anellis, a student of Jean van Heijenoort (1912--1986), edited a special issue of the journal \textit{Logica Universalis} to commemorate the centennial of his teacher's birth. The article under review is a contribution to that collection; see [Zbl 1268.03002] for details about the entire special issue. The essay is divided into three sections; each deals with the question of what logic is in light of three different approaches the author finds represented in van Heijenoort's \textit{œuvre}: one historical and two conceptual ones. The author dedicates one section to each approach, which are then followed by a ``Conclusion'' (pp.~388--391) and a bibliography (pp.~391--408). In Section~1,``Defining modern logic by its history'' (pp.~340--371), the author digs deep into van Hei\-jen\-oort's historical works for an answer to the question ``What is logic?'' The answer is, we are told, that modern logic is first-order mathematical logic as it originated with Frege and as it emerged from the fusion of the Frege-Russell line with the Boolean tradition in the 1920s and 1930s (pp.~388\,f.). It's not clear, however, what this answer is worth in light of the author's own conclusion that, ``[b]y no means, then, were Frege's or Russell's contemporaries in accord with [\dots] van Heijenoort, that the \textit{Be\-griffs\-schrift} was an original, even unique, work that altered the direction of formal logic'' (p.~345). In Section~2, ``Spitzfindigkeit'' (pp.~372--376), the author attempts to develop a conceptual approach to the same question, this time guided by the spare hints van Heijenoort gave in a brief review of an article written by Józef Bocheński, a Polish(-German) historian of logic. The contention seems to be that logic proper has to be formalized (p.~390); the actual argument made in Section~2, however, eludes me. Section~3, ``On the nature of logic'' (pp.~376--388), contains the third shot at the question, now based on two sets of unpublished manuscripts in van Heijenoort's \textit{Nachlass}, both from a folder labeled ``Logic, Nature of''. Pondering the question whether there is just one -- the true or ``basic'' -- logic or rather several different ones, it seems that van Heijenoort was trying to make an argument that first-order logic as we know it today should be considered that basic logic from which every other logic derives by some process of ``localization''. The latter term is here used as a catch-all expression for all requirements ordinary languages may impose for a full formalization of all their aspects (e.g., vagueness). Reviewer's remarks. I'd expect that this essay will be received differently. Some readers will appreciate the author's dedication to be comprehensive and to display rigorous scholarship down to every footnote. Some will find the style ``teutonic'' (footnotes longer than the main text) and their patience taxed by an author who won't miss a single opportunity to go off on tangents. The author has obviously poured his heart into this essay; I think it's safe to call it a major and important contribution to the literature on van Heijenoort. The text itself, however, is poorly copy-edited, with many typos, incorrect hyphenations, and sometimes somewhat confusing run-on sentences; below we provide a list of typos likely to cause some head scratching. While the length of the essay makes disagreement about details almost inevitable, I see two main shortcomings. First, the historical discussion never goes beyond van Heijenoort's own categories (e.g., language vs.\ calculus, absolute vs.\ relative, \textit{logica magna} vs.\ \textit{utens}) and thus doesn't leave their limitations behind. For example, the distinction according to what Kant called the ``doctrine of elements'' (\textit{Elementarlehre}) and the ``doctrine of method'' (\textit{Methodenlehre}) -- it goes back to the Logic of Port Royal, served as a mould for logic textbooks since, and played a prominent role throughout the 19th century -- is completely ignored. Consequently, I presume, important historical figures like John Stuart Mill play no role at all: Whig history at its best! Second, I think that the author's non-historical considerations follow van Heijenoort too closely, too. For example, the reflections on nonclassical logics would have considerably benefitted, I believe, from including more recent mathematical and philosophical perspectives, such as [\textit{J. Barwise}, ``Model-theoretic logics: background and aims'', in: Model-theoretic logics. New York: Springer-Verlag. 3--23 (1985; Zbl 0587.03001); \textit{J. C. Beall} and \textit{G. Restall}, Logical pluralism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press (2006)]. Selected typos: p.~341, line 7 from top: read ``an'' instead of ``and'' -- p.~341, line 8 from top: read ``angeschlossen'' instead of ``ausgeschlossenen'' -- p.~346, footnote 8, 5 lines down: read ``eigene'' instead of ``einige'' -- p.~348, line 12 from top: read ``consistency'' instead of ``completeness'' -- p.~350, paragraph 2, lines 2 and 4 from its beginning: read ``consistency'' instead of ``completeness'' -- p.~355, paragraph 1, line 9 from its end: delete ``for \textit{The Nation}'' -- p.~356, line 9 from the top: read ``or'' instead of ``and'' -- p.~356, line 16 from the top: read ``principled'' instead of ``principle'' -- p.~361, paragraph 2, line 8 from its beginning: read ``the latter is'' instead of ``the first is'' -- p.~362, line 7 from the top: read ``or'' instead of ``and'' -- p.~364, line 1 from top: read ``consistency'' instead of ``completeness'' -- p.~378, paragraph 2, line 4 from its beginning: read ``gesättigt'' instead of ``gestättigt'' -- p.~384, note 53, 4 lines down: read ``ohne'' instead of ``ohe.''