Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction (Q2256859): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:07, 9 July 2024

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Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
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    Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction (English)
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    23 February 2015
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    bidder-optimal signal structure
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    bid coordination mechanism
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    collusion
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    (Bayes) correlated equilibrium
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    first-price auction
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    public and private signals
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