FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION (Q4899994): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 02:40, 6 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6124376
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English
FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6124376

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    FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION (English)
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    10 January 2013
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    Cournot duopoly market
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    fee licensing
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    Nash bargaining solution
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    royalty licensing
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