Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186): Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 10:37, 11 July 2024

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English	Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor	scientific article

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Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (English)

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+Stable husbands
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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+An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
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Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186): Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 10:37, 11 July 2024

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