No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects (Q2362196): Difference between revisions

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+Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
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+Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
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+Fair Groves mechanisms
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+No-envy in queueing problems
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+Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
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+Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
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+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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+Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
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+Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
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+Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
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+No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
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+The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
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+Games of fair division
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+On the nonexistence of envy-free and egalitarian-equivalent allocations in economies with indivisibilities
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+Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
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+Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
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+Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
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+No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
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