Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via Endowments
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation via Endowments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
+Normal rank