Implementability via protective equilibria (Q800203): Difference between revisions

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+Stable voting schemes
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+On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
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+Stability in Voting
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank @@
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+Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
@@ Property / cites work: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes / rank @@
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+Voting with Proportional Veto Power
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+Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
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+Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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+The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
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